

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
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O 111100Z MAR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1005

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1850

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EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY, NIMETZ AND VEST

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, TU, MASS  
SUBJ: US-TURKISH RELATIONS

1. LAST NIGHT FOREIGN MINISTER OKCUN ISSUED ME AN "URGENT" SUMMONS TO MEET WITH HIM AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE. WHEN I ARRIVED HE TOLD ME GRIMELY THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT IN MONTEUX. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN HIGHLY DISTURBED AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONTACT ME IMMEDIATELY TO DELIVER A "STRONG PROTEST IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY" OVER THE APPARENT COURSE OF US POLICY VIS-A-VIS TURKEY. ECEVIT HAD RECEIVED, SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE SECRETARY'S REPLY TO HIS ORAL MESSAGE (STATE 60401) AND TWO REPORTS FROM TURKISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. ALL HAD CAUSED HIM GREAT CONCERN.

2. THE REPORTS FROM ESENBEL DEALT WITH TWO SUBJECTS. THE FIRST RELATED A REPLY BY THE SECRETARY TO A QUESTION PUT BY SENATOR SCHWEIKER DURING A MARCH 9 HEARING OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE IN WHICH THE SECRETARY PURPORTEDLY HAD REVERSED THE POSITION HE HAD TAKEN DURING HIS VISIT HERE AND EXPLICITLY LINKED THE  
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ISSUES OF THE DCA AND CYPRUS. THE SECOND REPORTED A CONVERSATION THAT ESENBEL HAD HAD WITH CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON WHICH QUOTED THE LATTER AS SAYING THAT THE DELAY IN THE HEARINGS HAD BEEN AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, NOT THE COMMITTEE, AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT EVEN HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED FOR AS EARLY AS APRIL 4 IF HAMILTON HAD NOT PERSONALLY INTERVENED TO FIX THAT DATE.

3. THESE REPORTS CONVINCED ECEVIT THAT CONTRARY TO THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT LAST MAY DURING HIS TRIP TO LONDON THE ADMINISTRATION WAS NOW ADOPTING A POLICY OF LINKAGE AND "THAT IT IS NOT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH TOWARDS TURKEY." IN FACT, THESE REPORTS ARE INTERPRETED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AS REPRESENTING AN INTERVENTION IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN TURKISH POLICY ON CYPRUS. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, OKCUN CONTINUED, WAS ATTEMPTING TO DEAL WITH THESE AS SEPARATE PROBLEMS AND HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT SECRETARY VANCE NOT ONLY UNDERSTOOD BUT AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH. ECEVIT'S WORDS WERE THAT THE US IS "DYNAMITING AND FORE-STALLING" HIS EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON BOTH GREECE AND CYPRUS, AND COULD AFFECT THE SUMMIT OUTCOME.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY, ACCORDINGLY, WAS FORCED TO EXPRESS ITS "DEEP REGRETS" AT THIS NEW STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. "IF THIS ATTITUDE PERSISTS, THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY WILL REVIEW ITS POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES, TOWARDS NATO, AS WELL AS TOWARDS THE PROPOSALS IT WILL MAKE IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM." THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER NOW HAD WAS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS "DRAGGING ITS FEET" IN AWAITING "DENKTASH'S PROPOSALS."

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5. I REPLIED THAT I HAD HAD NO REPORT ON THE SENATE HEARINGS AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE SECRETARY HAD SAID. AS FAR AS I WAS AWARE, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT LINKED CYPRUS AND THE DCA ALTHOUGH, AS I MYSELF HAD REPEATEDLY EXPLAINED, IT HAD TO DEAL WITH THE REALITY OF A LINKAGE THAT HAD BEEN MADE IN THE CONGRESS. AS REGARDS THE REPORT OF ESENBEL'S TALK WITH HAMILTON, I COULD ONLY SAY THAT THIS DID NOT ACCORD WITH THE REPORT I HAD RECEIVED AND WHAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT. I WOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION ON THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT.

6. OKCUN GAVE AN AWKWARD ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF ESENBEL'S REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SECRETARY SAID THAT US POLICY WOULD BE DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, THAT WE WERE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT MEETING AND THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ON CYPRUS TO BE CLARIFIED BEFORE ESTABLISHING THE POSITION WE WOULD TAKE IN THE APRIL HEARINGS. THIS OKCUN, SAID, WAS AN OVERT ENDORSEMENT OF LINKAGE.

7. I PROMISED I WOULD REPORT WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IMMEDIATELY. HOWEVER, I HAD TO SAY, RESPECTFULLY BUT FRANKLY, THAT I THOUGHT THIS WAS A GROSS OVERREACTION ON THE PRIMIN'S PART. AS I UNDERSTOOD THE STATEMENT HE HAD JUST QUOTED, THE SECRETARY WAS RELATING THE POSITION WE WOULD TAKE ON THE DCA TO OUR TOTAL INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. IN MY FIRST MEETING WITH OKCUN LAST JULY, HE HIMSELF HAD URGED THIS APPROACH, ARGUING THAT IN OUR PRE-OCCUPATION WITH CYPRUS WE WERE LOSING SIGHT OF WIDER AND MORE IMPORTANT INTERESTS. THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT IN MY VIEW MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WERE OTHER ISSUES THAN JUST CYPRUS THAT WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE EVALUATION THAT WOULD DETERMINE OUR POSITION ON THE DCA. OUR  
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INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ALSO ENCOMPASSED OUR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, THE SITUATION ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK AND THE ABILITY OF TURKISH FORCES TO MAKE THEIR EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. I THOUGHT THIS FORMULA SHOULD BE WELCOME TO TURKEY SINCE IT DEMONSTRATED THAT WE WOULD APPROACH THIS PROBLEM IN A BROADER FRAMWORK, WITH AN EYE TO ALL DEVELOPMENTS AND FACTORS IN THE REGION.

8. OKCUN SAID THAT IF THIS WAS THE CASE, WE SHOULD MAKE OUR MEANING CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY. HE REPEATED THAT THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT DID NOT LINK ITS RELATIONS WITH GREECE, CYPRUS AND THE US AND HAD BEEN SATISFIED TO RECEIVE THE SECRETARY'S ASSURANCE OF HIS AGREEMENT. WHAT WAS NOW BEING SAID WAS TAKNE BY THE PRIMIN AS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE A GREEK AND CYPRIOT HARD LINE IN THE HOPES OF MAINTAINING THE EMBARGO, AND THIS WOULD HINDER RATHER THAN FACILITATE HIS EFFORTS. ECEVIT ASKED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION OF THE US POSITION, PREFERABLY IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT REAFFIRMING THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE PRESEIDENT IN MAY IN LONDON.

9. I CONCLUDED BY REITERATING MY VIEW THAT THE PRIMIN HAD OVERREACTED. THE ADMINISTRATION FACED A DIFFICULT SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL PROBLEM WHICH WOULD BE EASED IF WE COULD SPEAK IN THE HEARINGS ON THE BASIS OF A BRIEFING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1006

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TURKISH PROPOSALS. OKCUN SAID THAT THFS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE SINCE THIS WOULD IMPLY TURKISH ACCEPTANCE OF A LINKAGE TO WHICH THEY WERE FIRMLY OPPOSED. AT THAT POINT, HE TOLD ME THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE RECORD OF OUR TALKS WITH THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT ON NOVEMBER 7 (77 ANKARA 8193) I HAD INFORMED HIS PREDECESSOR, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD APPROVED THE "SCENARIO" AND WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH THE DCA. THAT, HE SAID, WAS WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS THAT WE WOULD "EXAMINE" THE TURKISH PROPOSALS AND, FURTHERMORE, WAS IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD US IJ COULD NOT EVEN MAKE ANY TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE SUCH PROPOSALS AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSASL WOULD BE FAR BETTER THAN THOSE THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT HAD ENVISAGED. THE US WAS NOT TOUGHENING ITS POSITION IN A WAY THAT THE PRIMIN COULD ONLY REGARD AS "UNFRIENDLY" TOWARDS A GOVERNMENT WHICH ATTACHED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

10. COMMENT: AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, OKCUN'S DOUR DEMEANOR WOULD AMPLIFY THE UNPLEASANT ASPECTY OF ANY  
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MESSAGE. COMING DIRECTLY FROM ECEVIT THIS PRESENTATION WOUQD PROBABLY HAVE HAD A LESS BRUTAL FLAVOR. NEVERTHELESS, TURKISH SENSITIVITY AND SUSPICIOUSNESS IS ON A HAIR TRIGGER AND WILL PROBABLY INCREASE BETWEEN NOW AND APRIL 4 OR UNTIL WE CAN AFFIRM TO THEM THAT THE

ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO SUPPORT APPROVAL OF THE DCA IN THE UPCOMING HEARINGS. I RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY OR NIMETZ CALL IN ESENBEL AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND EXPLAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF A PUBLIC FORMULA WHICH RELATES OUR DCA POSITION TO OUR EVALUATION OF THE TOTALITY OF THE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, THE REASONS WE NEED MORE SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION ON THE TURKISH-CYPRITOT PROPOSALS (WHICH MIGHT BE CONVEYED TO US BY DENKTASH IF THIS WOULD REDUCE THE PROBLEMS GOT BELIEVES IT FACES) AND THE TACTICAL UNDESIRABILITY OF A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH CONGRESSIONAL OPPONENTS OF THE DCA ON THE ABSTRACT QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF LINKAGE AT THIS STAGE.

11. AT THIS POINT, THE TURKS ARE CONVINCED BY THE ZABLOCKI LETTER THAT WE HAVE OVERSTATED THE CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM FOR DARKER PURPOSES AND THAT OUR DESIRE TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THEIR PROPOSALS IS A STRATAGEM TO PRESSURE THEM RATHER THAN SOMETHING WE FEEL WE GENUINELY NEED TO HELP TO CONVINCE THE CONGRESS TO ACT FAVORABLY.

12. THIS MORNING I RECEIVED A CALL FROM FCG AMBASSADOR SAHM WHO SAYS THAT HE ALSO WAS CALLED IN TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY LAST NIGHT, RECEIVING A DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, AND WAS ASKED TO REQUEST BONN'S INTERVENTION WITH WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT. THE DANISH AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN CALLED IN  
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THIS MORNING AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EC-9, PRESUMABLY TO RECIBE THE SAME REQUEST.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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